Extraction of oil and gas from unconventional resources, recently enabled by technological innovations, revolutionized national and global markets. However, exploration and production still proceed under legacy regulations, mostly promulgated at the state level. The mismatch of modern production realities and historic regulatory structures creates opportunities for reducing conflicts that diminish economic value. This Article identifies regulations that originated under conventional extraction, and often enhance productivity in that setting, but create waste when applied to unconventional resources. Then, it identifies contractual solutions that have evolved as resource owners and extraction firms have adapted to new technologies. Contractual innovations help inform directions for regulatory reform.
INTRODUCTION
The resurgence of U.S. oil and natural gas production pivoted on exploitation of "unconventional" resources once considered subeconomic, but rendered profitable by transformative technological advances. 1 Expanded
2018]
REGULATORY OBSOLESCENCE 139 second is to define rights and responsibilities of firms vis-à-vis the owners of the resource. Balancing these two goals is a central challenge for regulation. While new technology has changed the first, the second has not been relieved. The technological shock to oil and gas production is not unique in the energy industry-other sectors, notably renewable electricity generation, have experienced technological leaps in recent years. 8 The advance for oil and gas production importantly, and perhaps uniquely, changes the nature of the resource being exploited. 9 While the severed oil and natural gas are comparable to those developed from conventional resources, unconventional oil and gas resources are fundamentally different in ways germane to effective and efficient regulation of extraction. This underscores the motivation for reconsidering oil and gas regulations. In contrast, other energy sectors, including natural gas pipeline transportation, have realized large economic gains from altered regulatory regimes. 10 Effects on the natural gas transportation industry have been large, but do not stem from technical innovations.
11
The current regulatory framework for oil and gas extraction is the product of more than a century of experience, 12 but it often falls short of statutory objectives and administrative implementation. By writing innovative contracts, private parties can work around some failings of the antiquated regime. Situations that do not offer opportunities for contractual remedies are excellent candidates for regulatory reform. Opportunities for reform are tempered by an important hazard. The temporal overlap between continuing extraction from conventional deposits and new exploitation of shale and other resources prevents regulators from simply switching to a new regulatory regime. This reality constrains potential reforms for existing development, but opens the door to new frontiers as more resources are identified and extracted. [Vol. 43:137
I. BACKGROUND

A. Unconventional Oil and Gas
"Unconventional" resources are producing formations that lack sufficient permeability to economically produce without technology beyond the traditional vertical well with artificial lift. 13 Some resources, such as shales and coals, are the source rock in which hydrocarbons originate, rather than reservoirs into which hydrocarbons migrate over time.
14 These resources require varying degrees of reservoir stimulation to increase permeability, often achieved by hydraulic fracturing. 15 After stimulating the reservoir in this fashion, the oil and gas trapped in the tight spaces of the rock can flow to the wellbore and then to the surface. 16 The technologies that have unlocked unconventional resources were developed after long experimentation. Considerable acknowledgment is afforded to the combination of horizontal drilling and largevolume hydraulic fracturing in the Barnett Shale in Texas, 17 though credit should be shared more widely. 18 The generalist term "fracking" encircles a large collection of technologies, including hydraulic fracturing, horizontal and directional drilling, and advanced seismography techniques 19 that have allowed profitable investment in resources that were 13 See, e.g., Liang Wang et al., A Technical Review on Shale Gas Production and Unconventional Reservoirs Modeling, 6 NAT. RESOURCES 141, 142 (2015) . A parsimonious way of differentiating between conventional and unconventional resources is to compare a measure of permeability: conventional reservoirs typically have permeability in the millidarcies (passage of one one-thousandth of a cubic centimeter of fluid (having a viscosity of one centipoise) per second through a sample one square centimeter in cross-sectional area under a pressure of one atmosphere per centimeter of thickness) whereas unconventional reservoirs have permeabilities measured in micro-or nanodarcies. The unconventional resources are therefore between a thousand and million times less likely to allow fluids to move under the surface. Here we distinguish between artificial lift and enhanced oil recovery by the need for more than simple artificial lift, such as repressuring formations to replace lost reservoir pressure. 14 See discussion infra Section II.C (discussing characteristics of unconventional sources). 15 Bocora, supra note 7. 16 Id. 17 See GOLD, supra note 1, at 15 (providing background on what features of the Barnett Shale in Texas led to technological innovation); see also ZUCKERMAN, supra note 1, at 34. 18 See generally Golden & Wiseman, supra note 1, at 968-76 (detailing various technologies that contributed to unlocking unconventional resources). 19 For a relatively early description of the impacts of technical change in oil and gas extraction, see Douglas L. Bohi, Changing Productivity in U.S. Petroleum Exploration and Development, Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 98-38 (1998). See also GOLD, supra note 1, at 5 (discussing similar topics).
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REGULATORY OBSOLESCENCE 141 subeconomic with conventional technology. 20 Other technologies have made important contributions to the ability to exploit unconventional resources economically: measurement-while-drilling technology, which allows for geosteering and effective control over directional and horizontal drilling; microseismic surveying, which allows for measurement and evaluation of fractures; packers and sleeves that isolate portions of the wellbore and create the possibility for "multi-stage" fracs; and thousands of other incremental innovations to elements of the exploration and production process. 21 One result of new technological capacity has been a massive increase in domestic oil and gas production, largely from previously subeconomic resources.
22 Domestic supply shocks have affected global markets, with the linkages more explicit thanks to the relaxation of a decades-old trade ban for crude oil, 23 and the new ability to export natural gas to overseas markets. 24 Before these pathways opened, notable basis differentials between U.S. and global oil benchmarks, and between U.S., European, and East Asian natural gas, were motivations for policy action. Relatively high prices and new technology led to a rapid proliferation of potential extraction sites, many of which are located in known geological provinces where conventional development failed or was only marginally productive (e.g., Bakken). 26 New drilling programs pressed into regions such as Pennsylvania and Ohio that were largely unfamiliar with the industry and its practices. 27 Mineral interest owners, surface landowners, local residents, and the general public in those places turned to oil and gas regulators for relief from transgressions real and perceived. 28 Because unconventional wells typically have much higher decline rates than historic conventional wells (meaning production naturally declines faster over time than conventional wells), 29 many more wells are needed to sustain production. 30 Residents' objections are usually centered on the drilling of thousands of new wells rather than the amount of production from each well. Because of relatively rapid production decline rates, developing unconventional resources requires a large number of wells.
31
Drilling such wells is subject to a wide variety of state regulations.
32
B. Oil and Gas Regulation
Regulation of oil and gas extraction activities has historically been the domain of states. 33 Regulation is loosely coordinated through the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission. 34 The Commission was founded in 1935 to help coordinate state efforts to prevent waste of oil and gas resources. 35 States have primary regulatory authority for oil and gas production within their boundaries. 36 Overlapping federal oversight has been contemplated, but aside from federally owned minerals, in most cases federal regulations do not directly pertain to oil and gas production activities.
37 New federal rules have been discussed, including regulations for methane leaks 38 and proposals regarding hydraulic fracturing, 39 but the future of these regulations and the extent to which they will change current industry practice is currently unclear. Primary regulatory oversight remains with the states.
40
The motivation for regulation of oil and gas production should lead the analysis of the efficacy of those regulations. Pertinent detail of the mechanisms by which regulation takes force follows. 
1.
Why Regulate Oil and Gas Extraction Activities?
Extraction, transport, and processing of oil and gas is subject to a range of regulation that varies across states. 41 Historically, three motivations inspired regulation. Uncertain Values
Imperfect information is a defining characteristic across a number of dimensions, starting with geological risk. Determining the location and richness of deposits is the focus of exploration efforts. 43 Even after discovery, substantial uncertainty about the future path of both costs and output prices potentially influences the expected value of a given deposit. 44 The revenue risk has two parts. One is production risk, which stems from imperfectly known geology. 45 Wells may perform well or poorly; they may start strong and peter out early. Until wells are drilled and produce, the time profile of production is not known. 46 The second part is price risk arising from the market. 47 Prices might swing at the whim of distant market forces, or because of manipulation by other actors such as local transportation firms. 48 The cause of the price change does not matter to the small producer so much as the magnitude and direction. 41 See BRADLEY, supra note 33 (providing a summary of cross-state variation in Chapter 3). See also Richardson et al., supra note 32, at 90-93. 42 One important study covers the development of property rights to petroleum resources but focuses entirely on common pool problems and the development of rights to address the economic problems created therein. Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights in the United States, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S589, S589-94 (2002) . A more recent and broader view considers both common pool externalities and pecuniary externalities stemming from market power attributable to the downstream transportation and processing sectors. John R. Boyce, Externality Regulation in Oil and Gas, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENERGY, NATURAL RESOURCE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 7-8 (2013). Even in a perfectly competitive setting, output price variation has been an important concern in securing the value of oil and gas deposits. Id. 43 Overview of oil and gas exploration and production process, in ENVT'L MGMT. IN OIL & GAS EXPLORATION AND PROD. 4. 44 Overview of oil and gas exploration and production process, supra note 43, at 7. 45 Id. at 6-7. 46 Id. 47 Shale Gas and Other Unconventional Sources of Natural Gas, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy-/coal-and-other-fossil-fuels/shale-gas-un conventional-sources-natural-gas#.W9YNBxNKjow [https://perma.cc/S78B-BF75] (last visited Oct. 29, 2018). 48 See Boyce, supra note 42, at 7-8.
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A collection of statutory and administrative law developed to deal with the information problems arising from geologic uncertainty; "[i]t is unfortunate that our law as to oil and gas developed before scientific information was available as to the exact nature of oil and gas reservoirs."
49 However, the reality is that some law had to be in place. Specific investments in learning required security, and law developed to provide it as uncertainty was resolved by drilling. Experience with exploration, production, and improving technology to evaluate resources ex ante has reduced the extent of the geological uncertainty. 50 Thanks in part to a century of experience, and the technologies that have allowed for exploitation of unconventional resources, changing the regulatory frame may now be feasible and offer benefits.
On the price risk front, risks for products and inputs are bettermanaged today than historically, thanks to futures markets and an extension of techniques of financial engineering to sell risk. 51 The majority of producers now use hedges or volumetric production payments to limit exposure to volatile output prices.
52 Improved risk management is a reality for inputs as well as outputs. As an example, long-term contracts for 49 A.W. Walker, Jr., Property Rights in Oil and Gas and Their Effect on the Police Regulation of Production, 16 TEX. L. REV. 370, 370 (1938). Although this observation was made while conventional resources were still relatively abundant, the alternative to rulemaking under uncertainty is hard to consider because of the high transaction costs inherent in developing scientific information. 50 In Texas, the dry hole rate fell from over 10 percent (one in ten wells drilled was dry) in 2005 to under 1 percent (less than one well in one hundred was dry) by 2007 Extraction from conventional deposits is rival, but not fully excludable. Extraction is often characterized as a common pool resource such as a depletable fishery or grazing common. 54 When oil and gas resources have many owners, as many conventional resources do, regulation has historically been viewed as one means to protect correlative rights. 55 In their study of the development of property rights to common pool petroleum reservoirs, Libecap and Smith (2002) delineate four possible end results of a common pool reservoir:
[T]here were four distinct property rights scenarios, each with its own costs and benefits, that provided alternative "resolutions" of the common-pool production externality: (1) extractive anarchy, in which actions by individual producers intending to exploit the rule of capture go unrestrained; (2) conservation regulation, in which government prohibits producers from engaging in specific wasteful actions that anarchy might invite; (3) buy-outs, in which a single producer purchases all others' holdings in the common pool and thus internalizes the externality; and (4) unitization, in which the separate producers exchange their individual holdings in the reservoir for agreed shares of a single, commonly managed enterprise that encompasses the entire pool. 56 Unitization is not always voluntary and can be imposed by regulation. 57 A complementary view is that three regimes are possible: extractive 53 As an example of relationship-specific gains in drilling, anarchy, regulation, or contractual solutions. Regulation can take the prototypical form of prescription of productive activities. Compulsory unitization is another form of regulation, and forces producers to reach a particular type of contractual solution. 58 Contractual solutions include voluntary unitization agreements and buyouts. 59 This underscores the tradeoff between regulatory and contractual solutions to common pool problems. Conservation regulation and buy-outs stand in stark contrast to one another in this regard. Recognizing that the efficiency loss attendant with extractive anarchy may differ for conventional versus unconventional deposits is key to understanding the motive for regulatory reforms.
Because the contents of the subsurface are uncertain ex ante, the rule of capture was adopted to dictate how oil and gas become private property. 60 The rule of capture holds that there is no liability for producing oil and gas that was originally in place under the land of another, so long as the producing well itself does not trespass. 61 The rule was adapted to oil and gas from previous applications to groundwater and wildlife. 62 Like oil and gas, in those original settings the transaction costs associated with verifying ownership ex ante are quite high, so the ex post rule of capture was adopted. 63 However, the capture rule led to concerns that correlative rights would be impinged upon by aggressive neighbors. 64 Such incentives could lead to rapid extraction and dissipated rents, as neighbors engage in a race to drill and as a result deplete virgin pressure faster than the rate 58 61 The standard definition of the rule comes from Hardwicke: "The owner of a tract of land acquires title to the oil and gas which he produces from wells drilled thereon, though it may be proved that part of such oil or gas migrated from adjoining lands." Robert E. Oil and natural gas found in either conventional or unconventional deposits are nonrenewable resources. 67 They can most cheaply be stored in the ground, 68 but such storage depends on secure property rights in situ. Property rights for common pool conventional resources are inherently insecure because a neighbor can always extract. 69 Once oil and gas are extracted, the patient owner has lost his or her product. The theoretical measure of the value of the marginal unit extracted is the user cost, or the opportunity cost of extracting today what could be saved and extracted in the future. 70 For deposits that are small relative to the current market size, this value is near the opportunity cost of extraction today.
2.
Regulatory Mechanisms for Oil and Gas Production Boyce (2013) provides a summary of regulatory interventions, achieved through a mix of statutory and administrative rules at both federal and state levels. 71 He focuses on seven dimensions: casing and plugging, spacing, prorationing, unitization, pooling, common carriers, and waste.
72 Although Boyce commingles regulations addressing two concurrent problems in oil and gas extraction (common pool and downstream 65 Boyce, supra note 42, at 9-10. 66 71 See Boyce, supra note 42, at 9-10. 72 Pakravan, supra note 70, at tbl.2. See also BRADLEY, supra note 33, at 1919-33 app. B (providing a longer list of federal statutes pertaining to oil and gas). However, because most regulation of oil and gas production is state-level, the federal statutes have limited application, largely limited to federal minerals. market power), several types of regulations are clearly applicable to commonality of the resource. 73 These include well spacing, pooling requirements, and unitization. 74 In addition, two classes of regulations relate to the inherent non-renewability of the resources: waste statutes and prorationing rules.
75 Bradley (1996) makes finer distinctions about the implementation of state regulation, but focuses on the same group of problems: spacing minimums, pooling, allowables (prorationing), and unitization. 76 The following discussion focuses on spacing, pooling, unitization, waste, and prorationing.
Regulations are intended to correct problems arising from extractive anarchy, like overinvestment in wells. 77 Despite the best intentions, regulations often fail to achieve their goals, and that failure creates real costs. The costs of oil regulation have been recognized for decades and are nontrivial. 78 The economic value unlocked by the technological advances in oil and gas will be diminished by continued regulation in counterproductive dimensions.
a.
Well Spacing
Too many wells in a reservoir can deplete virgin reservoir pressure without corresponding increased production, leaving valuable oil trapped underground and requiring pressure to be recreated by various costly means. 79 One way to avoid excessive mining of reservoir pressure is to limit the number of wells that can access the subsurface reservoir. Avoiding the forests of derricks that sprang up historically, notably in urban oil fields like Long Beach and Oklahoma City, was the primary motivation for well spacing requirements. 81 Initial spacing requirements were still tight by today's standards (one or two acres). 82 During World War II, spacing units were increased in size to reduce demand for steel. 83 The success of those larger spacing units (40 acres for oil and 640 acres for gas) led to wide adoption of larger spacing units in the postwar years. 84 Spacing units are the smallest spatial unit in regulatory standards. 85 They are imposed to avoid interference between wells by spreading the wells across the field so that each can maximize recovery. 86 The spacing unit varies in size based on geologic characteristics at the field level. 87 More transmissivity implies larger spacing units, to avoid interwell interference. In a world of vertical wells, the drained area is circular, so spacing units are an exercise in fitting circles into squares.
88
Figure 1: Drainage of Traditional Spacing Units
New technology has two implications for traditional spacing units. First, orientation matters for directional wells, and the drained area is no longer circular. A horizontal well drilled in one corner of a rectangular 81 Understanding Spacing in Oklahoma, OSEBERG, https://oseblog.oseberg.io/understand ing-spacing-oklahoma [https://perma.cc/5RGY-ZFQ9]. See also BRADLEY, supra note 33, at 141-43 (discussing other motivations for the development of well-spacing regulations). 82 BRADLEY, supra note 33, at 142. 83 Id. at 239-40. 84 Boyce, supra note 42, at 18. 85 Oil and Gas Basics, supra note 80. 86 Id. 87 Id. 88 Id. parcel will drain a slightly different area than one drained on the adjacent corner. Second, pad drilling means that spacing units include several wells rather than one, 89 and the notion that the spatial separation of wells is avoiding inter-well interference is false. 90 Within a unit, the operator has the incentive to maximize value because there is no external cost.
Figure 2: Drainage of Horizontal Spacing Units
Even though unconventional resources have less transmissivity, larger spacing units have been adopted as unconventional resources have come into play. 91 With horizontal drilling and ever-longer laterals on wells, spacing units have grown to 1280 acres and even larger. 92 These larger units cannot be drained by a single well, even if that well is fractured. 93 Technology has outstripped the spacing unit because the unit no longer represents the area drained by a single well. 94 If interfering wells maximize profits, then the operator, not the regulator, is best-positioned to determine that. 95 
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A direct example of the conflict between existing regulations and new technology is the increased need for exceptions to well spacing requirements. In Texas, the statewide spacing requirements-1200 feet between wells and 467 feet to the nearest property line-are established under an administrative rule known as Rule 37.
96 Specific fields can be regulated under different rules. As the area drained by a single well has changed, particularly with the advent of directional drilling, 97 the statewide spacing rules are wholly inadequate. Instead of working to coordinate a large group of adjoining mineral owners, many operators resort to a regulatory exception to the standard spacing rule. 98 The ad hoc nature of such exceptions, which are granted by acknowledging that the statewide or field spacing rule is inadequate for the modern realities of development, allow for fragmentation of the landscape and increase the potential for leaving a valuable resource trapped in small underground areas. The exceptions also allow for legal drainage of oil and gas from adjoining tracts. Texas is the largest producing state without forced pooling. Pooling Requirements
To form spacing units when mineral ownership is fragmented (a problem unique to the U.S.), 100 most states have regulatory provisions to avoid holdout by mineral owners and force those owners into a spacing unit with nearby owners. 101 This prevents recalcitrant mineral owners from trying to hold up an operator for better lease terms (and by extension, delaying the benefit of ownership to other mineral owners already in the unit).
102 States adopted rules that allowed owners wanting development to force their neighbors into producing units, for which those forced owners would be paid their duly owed share of production. 103 Pools rely on the regulatory notion of a spacing unit, and the pooling regulations came along after spacing units had been brought in. 104 Oklahoma and New Mexico were early adopters of statewide compulsory pooling rules in 1935, along with their adoption of well spacing rules. 105 Several other states followed after World War II. 106 Compulsory pooling was not needed until the well spacing rules arose because mineral owners could drill offsetting wells.
Forced pooling of wary and unwilling mineral owners has been an issue for unconventional resources, particularly because spacing units have become larger to accommodate horizontal drilling. 107 The chances of finding a single owner dwindle as required acreage increases. With long laterals for horizontal wells in unconventional reservoirs, the likelihood of finding a conforming surface tract is similarly small. Neither surface use nor conventional oil and gas production is conducive to such boundaries. This means that compulsory pooling or a similar mechanism is relatively more important in a world of unconventional extraction. Operational consolidation through a unit operating agreement, compulsory if a voluntary agreement is not forthcoming, has been considered a solution to suboptimal production incentives arising from common 103 [Vol. 43:137 resource pools and the rule of capture. 109 The unit operating agreement spells out the rights and responsibilities of different working interests, with the end result that a single entity is designated as the operator of the field or deposit, with all partners sharing accordingly in the net benefits of that extraction. 110 Limits in the ability of unitization to address all pertinent externalities in extraction have been detailed, 111 but unitization is generally regarded by economists as preferable to continued extraction from an uncontrolled common pool. 112 The dissipation of rents under competitive extraction conditions was a major motivation for imposing compulsory unitization statutes. 113 The gains from unitization are especially pronounced in conventional reservoirs because of the importance of pressure maintenance. 114 In the unconventional context pressure maintenance is less important because wells are not tapping into a commingled reservoir. However, economies of scale, which can be an important economic justification for conventional fields as well, 115 take on a special prominence. The combination of drilling and completion technologies can be very specific to particular geological formations. Firms that recognize more productive combinations of inputs are likely to reduce costs per unit recovered. This mechanism opens the door to gains from unitization, though the time profile likely differs from the conventional case. The costs of delay are likely smaller for unconventional resources.
d. Waste Statutes
The economic choice for oil and gas is when to extract; 116 the assumption that resources could be left in the ground and extracted in the future underlies the concepts of efficient resource use. 117 Resources can be wasted, either in place or once they have been severed from the ground and produced. Damaging reservoirs, e.g., squandering valuable 2018]
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virgin pressure, is one way resources can be wasted. 118 Another possibility is that resources can be lost after they are produced. 119 An important distinction to draw is the difference between physical and economic waste. Courts have focused on limiting physical waste of resources even while ignoring economic waste. 120 Physical waste is loss of products, often after they have been produced. 121 Economic waste includes the opportunity cost of producing resources by means that do not minimize costs.
122 Two specific forms of waste are included: one is failing to extract recoverable resources because of suboptimal decisions; the second is overinvestment in wells and other infrastructure.
123
The history of oil and gas extraction in the United States includes episodes of massive physical waste of severed production by modern standards. 124 Several wells in Caddo Parish, Louisiana, burned out of control for several years starting in 1905. 125 The Lakeview gusher in California spewed oil out of control for seventeen months from 1910-11. 126 At least four million barrels of oil are estimated to have been lost from a single well, even as a similar amount was salvaged. 127 By comparison, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010 discharged something on the order of five million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, most of which was lost. [Vol. 43:137
Even when a disaster was not occurring, historically free disposal of products was much more widespread. Data from the Energy Information Administration indicate that flaring and venting of associated gas was five times more widespread in the 1930s and 1940s than it is today.
129
The physical waste associated with massive blowouts, fires, and other disasters created the impetus for regulations intended to avoid waste. Techniques for well construction were not well-developed when these disasters occurred early in the history of extraction.
130 Drilling techniques had to be improved to avoid such waste. Avoiding the mistakes of past wells did not necessarily prevent the waste from gushers, blowouts, and fires. Techniques also had to be developed to kill out-ofcontrol wells and extinguish fires.
There are fewer disasters today, 131 but waste statutes are still relevant. One important factor is that most unconventional wells produce both oil and gas; conventional, associated gas is the closest analogy, in contrast to unassociated gas deposits and conventional oil deposits with little or no associated gas. 132 Oil now (and aside from a few isolated episodes, historically) has a higher economic value on a thermal equivalency basis. 133 In addition to output price motivation, there is also a cost advantage for oil. It requires less permanent infrastructure to move after extraction than does gas-oil is relatively easily trucked or shipped by rail; gas requires pipelines. 134 As a result, in some unconventional resource 157
areas, large quantities of natural gas are effectively unwanted byproducts of oil production. In many cases this gas is flared, or burned off, at the wellhead.
135
Two areas that have received substantial attention for increased levels of gas flaring are the Bakken shale in North Dakota and the Eagle Ford shale in South Texas. 136 North Dakota has accounted for as much as 40 percent of all flaring in the United States in recent years. 137 This phenomenon can be interpreted as a resurgence of physical waste of products; a key legal question surrounding these activities is whether the cost of capturing, processing, and marketing those products exceeds their value. It is possible that avoiding physical waste promotes economic waste. In some circumstances, the investments necessary to recover and market co-produced methane reduce the net value of oil production. 138 e.
Prorationing Rules
Resource discoveries have historically shifted supply and led to lower prices. 139 Efforts to limit supply in support of prices have two problems. First, an overall production target or cap (lower than the competitively supplied quantity) must be agreed upon. 140 the point that old rules would bind, enforcement might not be a good idea, as discussed below.
Environmental Regulation
An additional class of regulations relate to broader environmental impacts associated with the oil and gas production process. As an industrial process, oil and gas extraction impacts air, water, wildlife, cultural, and other resources. There are a number of proposals for new regulation of unconventional oil and gas development based on concerns about environmental impacts. 151 In most cases, these proposals apply equally to conventional and unconventional resources. The balance of the discussion here focuses on the resource-based issues as opposed to the environmental issues.
II. TECHNOLOGICALLY INDUCED REGULATORY OBSOLESCENCE
A. The Wellhead No Longer Exists as a Pertinent Regulatory Concept
The individual well is a focal element of the regulatory system. Individual wells are permitted before drilling, and production is reported at the well level.
152 A single vertical borehole with multiple laterals is an increasingly common production technique. 153 Is it a single well or several? If the latter, how are the laterals to be identified and treated? Inconsistency on this important fundament to the regulatory regime is evidenced by the uneven application of API numbers to horizontal wells and laterals across states. spacing (one well for each forty surface acres) a neighboring field with different geologic characteristics could have, more sensibly, 160-acre spacing. The discretion to set spacing unit size and to allow exemptions to the standard is generally exercised by the state oil and gas regulatory body. 160 Underlying the logic of the spacing unit is that each unit covers the area drained most effectively by a single well. 161 The extent to which one well will interfere with, or reduce the production of, another is learned by experience. When spacing units were introduced in the 1920s and 1930s, they were much smaller than today.
162
Spacing units have no uniform standard size and have been amended to allow new wells that do not interfere with existing ones.
163
Unconventional resources use directional and horizontal drilling to provide greater exposure of the wellbore to the source rocks. 164 There are economies of scale with using a common surface location for several wells. The result is "pad drilling" that disturbs less surface than numerous vertical wells. 165 However, with multiple wells on the same pad, typically all wells are located in one drilling unit. 166 The notion of spacing corresponding to an area drained by a single well has fallen by the wayside.
One reason for spacing units was to keep potentially competing conventional drillers far enough apart so their wells did not interfere with each other. 167 Pad drilling avoids this complication because a single firm will operate all wells on a given pad. 168 The firm must determine the optimal number of wells to drill on a single spacing unit. That decision is determined by technological choices, such as measuring the azimuth of a frac, which can be affected by varying inputs. 169 Pad drilling is effectively preemptory unitization. Technology and cost economies have solved one of the long-term problems oil and gas regulation sought to address.
Once a spacing unit contains more than one well, the timing of drilling additional wells is an open question. A single well in a spacing [Vol. 43:137 unit might be used as evidence of development, even if that well cannot extract all of the resources in place. 170 The firm can keep the entire acreage leased in this way, and this practice has been an anecdotal explanation for wasteful drilling patterns to avoid having to lease acreage again, perhaps under terms more favorable to the mineral owner.
171
Smith (2014) presents an option pricing model to suggest that this behavior is not likely to make a difference for a large number of wells.
172
The mineral owner may be concerned with the drilling of relatively few wells, or the holding of acreage with a single well. The value of the mineral estate is maximized if it is fully exploited. A mineral owner only leases acreage if the owner wants to produce the minerals and recognize the value. 173 In that case, the mineral owner would like all of the oil and gas extracted, and will be concerned if an insufficient number of wells is drilled to do so. The traditional recourse for the mineral owner is a Pugh clause, by which undrilled acreage can be released. 174 But if the undrilled wells are in a spacing unit that already contains one producing well, then the mineral owner does not have the ability to exercise a Pugh option.
175 So, the traditional contractual remedy is handicapped by the abuse of the spacing unit.
Permitting several wells on a spacing unit also poses an interesting problem for the force-pooled mineral owner. Suppose an owner is forced into a production unit, but perhaps only one well is drilled because of poor performance, or an unexpected price shock. The force-pooled mineral owner will be paid proportionally for production. However, suppose the single well does not enter her property-she is paid from the producing unit rather than extraction from her own minerals. Recall that the forced pooling occurred to avoid holdout for an area drained by a single 170 well. 176 But the single well is a myth, and the mineral owner has been coerced into a lease that she cannot break via Pugh clause (because there is only one spacing unit). 177 And, because the remaining minerals are physically located in her portion of the unit, the other mineral owners will demand the unit remain intact so that they will be paid for unit production not directly tied to their property.
C. Other Commonality Concerns
The geophysical characteristics of unconventional resources-low permeability and transmissivity-should attenuate commonality concerns. If hydrocarbons are trapped in place, then migration to a neighboring wellbore should not be a major concern. The reliance of unconventional extraction on hydraulic fracturing 178 complicates that simple reality. Reservoirs are fractured for the exact purpose of increasing transmissivity, allowing those trapped hydrocarbons to flow to the wellbore. 179 The fracture is man-made, so the idea of a fracture as trespass allowing theft of mineral resource is quite real. The very same microseismic technology that allows engineers to carefully monitor fractures and reservoir stimulation could allow for verification that trespass occurred. 180 Any hopes that new technologies would lift the mantle of commonality from oil and gas extraction were dashed by the Texas Supreme Court in Coastal v. Garza. 181 The decision upheld the rule of capture as the primary means of establishing ownership, even where trespass by fracture occurred. 182 The primary logic of the court in this case was that it was not possible to determine where fractures are in the subsurface, and gas wells. Even if an unconventional well produces a majority of thermal equivalent units as gas, the "wet" nature of unconventional raw gas streams can imply that the share of the total value from dry gas is much lower.
194
Waste of oil and gas resources is generally prohibited.
195 But unconventional resources present new problems. The days of uncontrollable blowouts are largely gone; technical means for preventing and addressing such accidents have vastly improved, and the number of virgin conventional reservoirs capable of producing a "gusher" has dwindled. 196 Instead of overt waste like a blowout, the jointness of production leads to concerns about waste of one product.
North Dakota has been an exemplar of a rural resource boom distant from existing infrastructure. 197 As a consequence, flaring of natural gas expanded dramatically-to the point that, in recent years, in excess of 30 percent of all gas has been flared at the wellhead. 198 Increased flaring has also been observed in Texas (albeit at lower levels than in North Dakota), especially in the Eagle Ford shale. 199 These are more than just unfortunate coincidences. By treating unconventional resource development as a collection of autonomous wells, rather than an integrated production process including gathering and transmission pipelines, along with appurtenant fractionation plants, some product will be wasted. This leaves regulators in the (ill-suited) position to determine if the waste is merely physical or economic. North Dakota has moved in the direction [Vol. 43:137 of a more holistic treatment of new wells, conditioning well approvals on broad plans to capture and market associated gas. 200 In light of the greater integration of the supply chain, it is important to recognize that oil and gas commissions do not directly regulate pipelines and infrastructure. State public utility commissions usually have primary responsibility, though interstate transmission lines are regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 201 Oil and natural gas pipelines are subject to different oversight. Balkanization of regulatory authority makes consideration of economic waste difficult because value depends on vertical linkages. Identified waste at an intermediate point in the supply chain may not be waste at all, but can be an artifact of downstream constraints or regulation.
E. Water and Oil Mix More Than They Used to
One result of the transition to unconventional resources and extraction techniques is that water is an essential input in the production process. 202 Oilfield brines have long been produced as a byproduct of conventional technologies-they continue to be generated as "produced water" that has been identified as a key pathway for potential environmental damage. 203 Hydraulic fracturing operations require base water as well (which can be recycled from produced water in some cases). 204 In some states, source water falls into different regulatory regimes depending on whether it comes from surface or ground water. 207 The gains from integrating these regimes are a topic unto themselves.
III. CONTRACTUAL REMEDIES
Technical changes make existing regulations obsolete, but do not eliminate all problems. Unconventional resources present some novel issues. Interested parties have worked to contract around the new realities. Two contractual interactions are discussed: the principal-agent problem between mineral owner and developer addressed by the oil and gas lease; and the interactions between different oil and gas companies, which are less circumscribed.
A. Oil and Gas Leases
The mineral owner and developer engage in a contract-usually an oil and gas lease-to outline rights and responsibilities of each. 208 Not every mineral owner signs a lease to take a royalty interest. Some decide to participate in development, which means they bear costs as well as receive benefits. Participation is relatively rare, so most mineral owners are bound by a lease. Some interactions are zero-sum, affecting only the distribution of gains, whereas others affect the total amount of surplus created. 209 From a social perspective, the latter are far more important. Zero-sum interactions may be salient to the owner, such as requiring third-party validation of product pricing rather than accepting netback pricing at the wellhead.
The positive-sum interactions pertain to the efficient exploitation of the resource. Because commonality is not the primary concern for unconventional resources, 210 the primary considerations are the dynamics of the leasing and development process, and the complementarity of wells and related infrastructure.
